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Everett’s Many-Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics is discussed in the context of other
physics disputes and other proposed kinds of parallel universes. We find that only a small fraction
of the usual objections to Everett’s theory are specific to quantum mechanics, and that all of the
most controversial issues crop up also in settings that have nothing to do with quantum mechanics.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is now great interest in Everett’s Many-Worlds
Interpretation of quantum mechanics and the controversy
surrounding it.1 A key reason for this is undoubtedly
that it connects with some of our deepest questions about
the nature of reality. How large is physical reality? Are
there parallel universes? Is there fundamental random-
ness in nature?
The goal of this article is to place both Everett’s theory
and the standard objections to it in context. We will re-
view how Everett’s Many Worlds may constitute merely
one out of four different levels of parallel universes, the
rest of which have little to do with quantum mechanics.
We will also analyze the many objections to Everett’s
theory listed in Table 1, concluding that most of them
are not specific to quantum mechanics. By better under-
standing this context, quantum physicists can hopefully
avoid reinventing many wheels that have been analyzed
in detail in other areas of physics or philosophy, and fo-
∗To appear in “Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory and Re-
ality”, S. Saunders, J. Barrett, A. Kent & D. Wallace (eds), Oxford
Univ. Press
1 The controversy shows no sign of abating, as evidenced by the
results of the following highly unscientific poll carried out by
the author at the Perimeter Institute “Everett@50” Conference
9/22-07:
1. Do you believe that new physics violating the Schro¨dinger
equation will make large quantum computers impossible? (4
Yes/ 29 No/11 Undecided)
2. Do you believe that all isolated systems obey the Schro¨dinger
equation (evolve unitarily)? (17 Yes/10 No/20 Undecided)
3. Which interpretation of quantum mechanics is closest to
your own?
• 2 Copenhagen or consistent histories (including pos-
tulate of explicit collapse)
• 5 Modified dynamics (Schrdinger equation modified to
give explicit collapse)
• 19 Many worlds/consistent histories (no collapse)
• 2 Bohm
• 1.5 Modal
• 22.5 None of the above/undecided
4. Do you feel comfortable saying that Everettian parallel uni-
verses are as real as our universe? (14 Yes/26 No/8 Unde-
cided)
cus their efforts on those remaining aspects of Everett’s
theory that are uniquely quantum-mechanical. This is
not to say that the issues in Table 1 with a “No” in
the QM-specific column are necessarily unimportant —
merely that it is unfair to blame Hugh Everett for them
or to use them as evidence against his theory alone.
Rather than discuss these objections one by one in the
order they appear in Table 1, this article is structured as
a survey of multiverse theories, addressing the objections
in their natural context. We then return to Table 1 and
summarize our conclusions in Section VI.
A. The MWI: what it is and what it isn’t
Let us first spell out what we mean by the Many
Worlds Interpretation (MWI) Much of the early criticism
of the MWI was based on confusion as to what it meant.
Here we grant Everett the final say in how the MWI is
defined, since he did after all invent it [1, 2], and take it
to consist of the following postulate alone:
• EVERETT POSTULATE:
All isolated systems evolve according to the
Schro¨dinger equation ddt |ψ〉 = −
i
~
H |ψ〉.
More succinctly, “physics is unitary”. Although this pos-
tulate sounds rather innocent, it has far-reaching impli-
cations:
1. Corollary 1: the entire Universe evolves according
to the Schro¨dinger equation, since it is by definition
an isolated system.
2. Corollary 2: when a superposition state is ob-
served, there can be no definite outcome (wavefunc-
tion collapse), since this would violate the Everett
postulate.
Because of corollary 1, “universally valid quantum me-
chanics” is often used as a synonym for the MWI. What
is to be considered “classical” is therefore not specified
axiomatically (put in by hand) in the MWI — rather, it
can be derived from the Hamiltonian dynamics, by com-
puting decoherence rates.
How does corollary 2 follow? Consider a measurement
of a spin 1/2 system (a silver atom, say) where the states
“up” and “down” along the z axis are denoted |↑〉 and |↓〉.
Assuming that the observer will get happy if she measures
2Table 1. Most common worries about Everett’s many-worlds interpretation are not specific to quantum mechanics.
Worry QM-specific? Counterexamples/resolution
1 Popper worry: falsifiable? No General relativity, inflation
2 Occam worry: parallel universes feel wasteful No Level I & 2 multiverses
3 Aristotle worry: math mere approximation No Linked to expernal reality hypothesis
4 Uncertainty worry: How can omniscience allow uncertainty? No Occurs whenever observer ensemble
5 How derive probabilities from deterministic theory? No Occurs whenever observer cloning
6 Unequal probability worry: Why square the amplitudes? Yes Comes from Hilbert space structure
7 ρ worry: describes world or my knowledge of it? Partly Can describe both
8 How judge evidence for/against such a theory? No Classical statistical mechanics
9 Word worry: What do we mean by “exist”, “real”, “is”, etc? No Level I & II multiverses
10 Invisibility worry: Why can’t we detect the parallel worlds? Yes Solved by decoherence
11 Basis worry: What selects preferred basis? Yes Solved by decoherence
12 Weirdness worry No Electric fields, black holes, Levels I & II
spin up, we let | -¨ 〉, | ¨^ 〉 and |_¨〉 denote the states of the
observer before the measurement, after perceiving spin
up and after perceiving spin down, respectively. If the
measurement is to be described by a unitary Schro¨dinger
time evolution operator U = e−iHτ/~ applied to the total
system, then U must clearly satisfy
U |↑〉⊗| -¨ 〉 = |↑〉⊗| ¨^ 〉 and U |↓〉⊗| -¨ 〉 = |↓〉⊗|_¨〉. (1)
Therefore if the atom is originally in a superposition
α|↑〉+ β|↓〉, then the Everett postulate implies that the
state resulting after the observer has interacted with the
atom is
U(α|↑〉 + β|↓〉)⊗ | -¨ 〉 = α|↑〉 ⊗ | ¨^ 〉+ β|↓〉 ⊗ |_¨〉. (2)
In other words, the outcome is not |↑〉⊗ | ¨^ 〉 or |↓〉⊗ |_¨〉
with some probabilities, merely these two states in super-
position. Very few physicists have actually read Everett’s
original 137-page Ph.D. thesis (reprinted in [2]), which
has lead to a common misconception that it contains a
second postulate along the following lines:
• What Everett does NOT postulate:
At certain magic instances, the world undergoes
some sort of metaphysical “split” into two branches
that subsequently never interact.
This is not only a misrepresentation of the MWI, but
also inconsistent with the Everett postulate, since the
subsequent time evolution could in principle make the
two terms in equation (2) interfere. According to the
MWI, there is, was and always will be only one wavefunc-
tion, and only decoherence calculations, not postulates,
can tell us when it is a good approximation to treat two
terms as non-interacting.
B. Many worlds galore
Parallel universes are now all the rage, cropping up in
books, movies and even jokes: “You passed your exam in
many parallel universes — but not this one.” However,
they are as controversial as they are popular, and it is
important to ask whether they are within the purview
of science, or merely silly speculation. They are also
a source of confusion, since many forget to distinguish
between different types of parallel universes that have
been proposed[3, 4].
The farthest you can observe is the distance that light
has been able to travel during the 14 billion years since
the big-bang expansion began. The most distant visible
objects are now about 4×1026 meters away2, and a sphere
of this radius defines our observable universe, also called
our Hubble volume, our horizon volume or simply our
universe. Below I survey physics theories involving par-
allel universes, which form a natural four-level hierarchy
of multiverses (Figure 1) allowing progressively greater
diversity.
• Level I: A generic prediction of cosmological infla-
tion is an infinite “ergodic” space, which contains
Hubble volumes realizing all initial conditions —
including an identical copy of you about 1010
29
m
away.
• Level II: Given the fundamental laws of physics
that physicists one day hope to capture with equa-
tions on a T-shirt, different regions of space can
exhibit different effective laws of physics (physi-
cal constants, dimensionality, particle content, etc.)
corresponding to different local minima in a land-
scape of possibilities.
• Level III: In Everett’s unitary quantum mechan-
ics, other branches of the wavefunction add nothing
qualitatively new, which is ironic given that this
level has historically been the most controversial.
• Level IV: Other mathematical structures give dif-
ferent fundamental equations of physics for that T-
shirt.
2 After emitting the light that is now reaching us, the most distant
things we can see have receded because of the cosmic expansion,
and are now about about 40 billion light years away.
3The key question is therefore not whether there is a mul-
tiverse (since Level I is the rather uncontroversial cosmo-
logical concordance model), but rather how many levels
it has.
Below we will discuss at length the issue of evidence
and whether this is science or philosophy. For now, the
key point to remember is that parallel universes are not
a theory, but a prediction of certain theories. The Pop-
per worry listed in Table 1 is the question of whether
Everett’s theory is falsifiable. For a theory to be falsi-
fiable, we need not be able to observe and test all its
predictions, merely at least one of them. Consider the
following analogy:
General Relativity Black hole interiors
Inflation Level I parallel universes
Unitary quantum mechanics Level III parallel universes
Because Einstein’s theory of General Relativity has suc-
cessfully predicted many things that we can observe,
we also take seriously its predictions for things we can-
not observe, e.g., that space continues inside black hole
event horizons and that (contrary to early misconcep-
tions) nothing funny happens right at the horizon. Like-
wise, successful predictions of the theories of cosmologi-
cal inflation and unitary3 quantum mechanics have made
some scientists take more seriously their other predic-
tions, including various types of parallel universes.
Let us conclude with two cautionary remarks before
delving into the details. Hu¨bris and lack of imagina-
tion have repeatedly caused us humans to underestimate
the vastness of the physical world, and dismissing things
merely because we cannot observe them from our van-
tage point is reminiscent of the ostrich with its head in
the sand. Moreover, recent theoretical insights have in-
dicated that Nature may be tricking us. Einstein taught
us that space is not merely a boring static void, but
a dynamic entity that can stretch (the expanding uni-
verse), vibrate (gravitational waves) and curve (gravity).
Searches for a unified theory also suggest that space can
“freeze”, transitioning between different phases in a land-
scape of possibilities just like water can be solid, liquid or
gas. In different phases, effective laws of physics (parti-
cles, symmetries, etc..) could differ. A fish never leaving
the ocean might mistakenly conclude that the properties
of water are universal, not realizing that there is also
ice and steam. We may be smarter than fish, but could
be similarly fooled: cosmological inflation has the de-
ceptive property of stretching a small patch of space in
a particular phase so that it fills our entire observable
universe, potentially tricking us into misinterpreting our
3 As described below, the mathematically simplest version of quan-
tum mechanics is “unitary”, lacking the controversial process
known as wavefunction collapse.
local conditions for the universal laws that should go on
that T-shirt.
4
5II. LEVEL I: REGIONS BEYOND OUR COSMIC
HORIZON
Let us return to your distant twin. If space is infi-
nite and the distribution of matter is sufficiently uniform
on large scales, then even the most unlikely events must
take place somewhere. In particular, there are infinitely
many other inhabited planets, including not just one but
infinitely many with people with the same appearance,
name and memories as you. Indeed, there are infinitely
many other regions the size of our observable universe,
where every possible cosmic history is played out. This
is the Level I multiverse.
A. Evidence for Level I parallel universes
Although the implications may seem crazy and
counter-intuitive, this spatially infinite cosmological
model is in fact the simplest and most popular one on
the market today. It is part of the cosmological concor-
dance model, which agrees with all current observational
evidence and is used as the basis for most calculations
and simulations presented at cosmology conferences. In
contrast, alternatives such as a fractal universe, a closed
universe and a multiply connected universe have been se-
riously challenged by observations. Yet the Level I mul-
tiverse idea has been controversial (indeed, an assertion
along these lines was one of the heresies for which the Vat-
ican had Giordano Bruno burned at the stake in 16004),
so let us review the status of the two assumptions (infi-
nite space and “sufficiently uniform” distribution).
How large is space? Observationally, the lower bound
has grown dramatically (Figure 2) with no indication of
an upper bound. We all accept the existence of things
that we cannot see but could see if we moved or waited,
like ships beyond the horizon. Objects beyond cosmic
horizon have similar status, since the observable universe
grows by a light-year every year as light from further
away has time to reach us5. If anything, the Level I mul-
tiverse sounds trivially obvious. How could space not
be infinite? Is there a sign somewhere saying ”Space
Ends Here–Mind the Gap”? If so, what lies beyond it?
In fact, Einstein’s theory of gravity calls this intuition
into question. Space could be finite if it has a convex
curvature or an unusual topology (that is, interconnect-
edness). A spherical, doughnut-shaped or pretzel-shaped
universe would have a limited volume and no edges. The
cosmic microwave background radiation allows sensitive
tests of such scenarios. So far, however, the evidence is
4 Bruno’s ideas have since been elaborated by, e.g., [5, 6], all of
whom have thus far avoided the stake.
5 If the cosmic expansion continues to accelerate (currently an
open question), the observable universe will eventually stop grow-
ing.
sibility, the lower limit on the size of our universe has kept
growing.
against them. Infinite models fit the data, and strong
limits have been placed on the alternatives [7, 8]. In ad-
dition, a spatially infinite universe is a generic prediction
of the cosmological theory of inflation [6], so the striking
successes of inflation listed below therefore lend further
support to the idea that space is after all infinite just as
we learned in school.
Another loophole is that space is infinite but matter
is confined to a finite region around us – the historically
popular “island universe” model. In a variant on this
model, matter thins out on large scales in a fractal pat-
tern. In both cases, almost all universes in the Level I
multiverse would be empty and dead. But recent ob-
servations of the three-dimensional galaxy distribution
and the microwave background have shown that the ar-
rangement of matter gives way to dull uniformity on large
scales, with no coherent structures larger than about 1024
meters. Assuming that this pattern continues, space be-
yond our observable universe teems with galaxies, stars
and planets.
B. What are Level I parallel universes like?
The physics description of the world is traditionally
split into two parts: initial conditions and laws of physics
specifying how the initial conditions evolve. Observers
living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact
same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial
conditions than those in our Hubble volume. The cur-
rently favored theory is that the initial conditions (the
densities and motions of different types of matter early
on) were created by quantum fluctuations during the in-
flation epoch (see section 3). This quantum mechanism
generates initial conditions that are for all practical pur-
poses random, producing density fluctuations described
by what mathematicians call an ergodic random field.
Ergodic means that if you imagine generating an ensem-
ble of universes, each with its own random initial con-
ditions, then the probability distribution of outcomes in
a given volume is identical to the distribution that you
get by sampling different volumes in a single universe. In
other words, it means that everything that could in prin-
ciple have happened here did in fact happen somewhere
else.
Inflation in fact generates all possible initial conditions
with non-zero probability, the most likely ones being al-
most uniform with fluctuations at the 10−5 level that
are amplified by gravitational clustering to form galaxies,
stars, planets and other structures. This means both that
pretty much all imaginable matter configurations occur
in some Hubble volume far away, and also that we should
expect our own Hubble volume to be a fairly typical one
— at least typical among those that contain observers.
A crude estimate suggests that the closest identical copy
of you is about ∼ 1010
29
m away. About ∼ 1010
91
m away,
there should be a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical
to the one centered here, so all perceptions that we have
during the next century will be identical to those of our
6counterparts over there. About ∼ 1010
115
m away, there
should be an entire Hubble volume identical to ours.6
C. How derive probabilities from a causal theory?
Let us now turn to worry 4 and worry 5 in Table 1.
The Level I multiverse raises an interesting philosophical
point: you would not be able to compute your own future
even if you had complete knowledge of the entire state of
the cosmos! The reason is that there is no way for you
to determine which of these copies is “you” (they all feel
that they are). Yet their lives will typically begin to differ
eventually, so the best you can do is predict probabilities
for what you will observe, corresponding to the fractions
of these observers that experience different things. This
kills the traditional notion of determinism even without
invoking quantum mechanics.
However, perhaps it is a uniquely quantum-mechanical
phenomenon that you can end up with subjective indeter-
minism even if only a single you exists to start with? No,
because we can create the same phenomenon in the fol-
lowing simple gedanken experiment involving only classi-
cal physics, without even requiring any sort of multiverse
(not even Level I). You are told that you will be sedated,
that a perfect clone of you will be constructed (includ-
ing your memories), and that the two yous will be woken
up by a bell at the same time the next morning in two
identical-looking rooms. The rooms are numbered 0 and
1, and these numbers are printed on a sign outside the
door. When asked by the anesthesiologist to place a bet
on where you will wake up, you realize that you have to
give her 50-50 odds, because someone feeling that they
are you will wake up in both. When you awaken, you re-
alize that you’d still give 50-50 odds, because even if you
knew the position of every atom in the universe, you still
couldn’t know which of the two yous is the one having
your current subjective experience. When you go out-
side, the room number you read will therefore feel just
like a random number to you.
Now suppose instead that you were told that this ex-
periment would be repeated 10 more times, resulting in
a total of 210 clones in 1024 identical rooms which have
6 This is an extremely conservative estimate, simply counting all
possible quantum states that a Hubble volume can have that are
no hotter than 108K. 10115 is roughly the number of protons
that the Pauli exclusion principle would allow you to pack into
a Hubble volume at this temperature (our own Hubble volume
contains only about 1080 protons). Each of these 10115 slots can
be either occupied or unoccupied, giving N = 210
115
∼ 1010
115
possibilities, so the expected distance to the nearest identical
Hubble volume isN1/3 ∼ 1010
115
Hubble radii∼ 1010
115
meters.
Your nearest copy is likely to be much closer than 1010
29
meters,
since the planet formation and evolutionary processes that have
tipped the odds in your favor are at work everywhere. There
are probably at least 1020 habitable planets in our own Hubble
volume alone.
their numbers written out in binary. When asked to place
bets on your room number, you assign an equal probabil-
ity for all of them. However, you can give more interest-
ing odds on what fraction of the ten binary digits on your
door will be zeros, knowing from the binomial theorem
that it’s 50% for
(
10
5
)
= 254 yous, 20% for
(
10
1
)
= 45
yous, etc. You can therefore say that you will probably
see a random-looking string of zeroes and ones on your
door, with an 89% chance that the fraction of ones will
be between 30% and 70%. This conclusion is exactly the
same as you would draw if you instead assumed that there
was only one of you, and that you would be placed in a
random room. Or that there was only one one you and
one room, whose 10 digits were each generated randomly
with 50% probability for both 0 and 1.
In Everett’s MWI, probability appears from random-
ness in exactly the same way if the branches have equal
amplitude: one you evolves into more than one through
deterministic Hamiltonian dynamics as in Equation (2)
with α = β = 2−1/2. The only difference is what the
physical nature of the cloning process is. In our exam-
ple above, another difference is that the hospital guests
can meet and verify the existence of their clones, whereas
quantum clones cannot because of decoherence — how-
ever, the hospital experiment could easily be modified to
have this property too, say by keeping the rooms locked
forever or shipping the clones off into deep space with-
out radios. It is therefore observer cloning that is the
crux, not what physics is involved in the cloning process.
You need to end up with more than one post-experiment
you with different recent experiences, but having identi-
cal memories from before the experiment.
In summary, although these classical parallels have not
ended the debates over probability in the Everett picture,
as evidenced by the continuing controversy over whether
probability makes sense in the many worlds interpreta-
tion (this volume, Part 3, Part 4), they do show that
worries 4 and 5 appear already in classical physics. That
is, whenever there are multiple observers with identical
memories of what happened before a certain point but
differing afterwards, these observers will perceive appar-
ent randomness even if the evolution of their universe
is completely deterministic. Whenever an observer is
cloned, she will perceive something completely indistin-
guishable from true randomness. Since both of these phe-
nomena can be realized without quantum mechanics, ap-
parent causality breakdown and randomness are there-
fore not quantum-specific. Unitary quantum mechan-
ics has these attributes simply because it routinely cre-
ates observer cloning when an instability rapidly ampli-
fies microsuperpositions into macrosuperpositions, while
decoherence ensures — effectively — that the doors be-
tween the clones are kept locked forever. Examples of
such instabilities include most quantum measurements,
Schro¨dinger’s cat experiment and, probably, certain snap
decision processes in the brain.
7D. How a multiverse theory can be tested and
falsified
Is a multiverse theory one of metaphysics rather than
physics? This is the concern listed as worry 1 in Table 1.
As emphasized by Karl Popper, the distinction between
the two is whether the theory is empirically testable and
falsifiable. Containing unobservable entities does clearly
not per se make a theory non-testable. For instance, a
theory stating that there are 666 parallel universes, all of
which are devoid of oxygen makes the testable prediction
that we should observe no oxygen here, and is therefore
ruled out by observation.
As a more serious example, the Level I multiverse
framework is routinely used to rule out theories in mod-
ern cosmology, although this is rarely spelled out explic-
itly. For instance, cosmic microwave background (CMB)
observations have recently shown that space has almost
no curvature. Hot and cold spots in CMB maps have
a characteristic size that depends on the curvature of
space, and the observed spots appear too large to be
consistent with the previously popular “open universe”
model. However, the average spot size randomly varies
slightly from one Hubble volume to another, so it is im-
portant to be statistically rigorous. When cosmologists
say that the open universe model is ruled out at 99.9%
confidence, they really mean that if the open universe
model were true, then fewer than one out of every thou-
sand Hubble volumes would show CMB spots as large
as those we observe — therefore the entire model with
frits entire Level I multiverse of infinitely many Hubble
volumes is ruled out, even though we have of course only
mapped the CMB in our own particular Hubble volume.
A related issue is worry 8 in Table 1: how does one
judge evidence for/against a multiverse theory, if some
small fraction of the observers get fooled by unusual
data? For example, of a Stern Gerlach apparatus is used
to measure the spin in the z-direction of 10000 particles
prepared with their spin in the x-direction, most of the
210000 resulting observers will observe a random looking
sequence with about 50% spin-up, but one of them will
be unlucky enough to measure spin up every time and
mistakenly conclude that quantum mechanics is incor-
rect.
This issue clearly has nothing to do with quantum me-
chanics per se, since it also occurs in our last hospital
example from Section II C. Suppose the 1024 clones are
all considering the hypothesis that what happened to
them is indeed the cloning experiment as described in
Section II C, trying to decide whether to believe it or
not. They all observe their room numbers, and most
of them find it looking like a random sequence of zeros
and ones, consistent with the hypothesis. However, one
of the clones observes the room number ”0000000000”,
and declares that the hypothesis has been ruled out at
99.9% confidence, because if the hypothesis were true,
the probability of finding oneself in the very first room is
only 1/1024. Similar issues also tormented some of the
pioneers of classical statistic mechanics: in the grand en-
semble at the heart of the theory, there would always be
some totally confused observers who repeatedly saw eggs
unbreak and cups of water spontaneously separate into
steam and ice.
When they occur in examples not involving quantum
mechanics, these issues are generally considered resolved,
merely exemplifying what confidence levels are all about.
If anybody in any context says that she has ruled some-
thing out at 99.9% confidence, she means that there is a 1
in 1000 chance that she has been fooled. Whenever there
is any form of randomness, either ontologically funda-
mental as in the Copenhagen interpretation, apparent as
in the MWI or merely epistemological (reflecting our in-
ability to predict detector noise, say), there is a risk that
we get fooled by fluke data. In most cases, we can reduce
this risk as much as we want by performing more mea-
surements, but in some cases we cannot, say when mea-
suring the large-scale power spectrum in the cosmic mi-
crowave background, where further measurements would
only help if we could perform them in outside of our cos-
mic horizon volume, i.e., in Level I parallel universes.
The take-home message from this section is that the
MWI and indeed any multiverse theories can be tested
and falsified, but only if they predict what the ensemble
of parallel universes is and specify a probability distri-
bution (or more generally what mathematicians call a
measure) over it. This measure problem can be quite se-
rious and is still unsolved for some multiverse theories
(see [9–14] for recent reviews), but is solved for both sta-
tistical mechanics and for quantum mechanics in a finite
space.
III. LEVEL II: OTHER POST-INFLATION
BUBBLES
If you felt that the Level I multiverse was large and
hard to stomach, try imagining an infinite set of distinct
ones (each symbolized by a bubble in Figure 1), some per-
haps with different dimensionality and different physical
constants. This is what is predicted by most currently
popular models of inflation, and we will refer to it as
the Level II multiverse. These other domains are more
than infinitely far away in the sense that you would never
get there even if you traveled at the speed of light for-
ever. The reason is that the space between our Level I
multiverse and its neighbors is still undergoing inflation,
which keeps stretching it out and creating more volume
faster than you can travel through it. In contrast, you
could travel to an arbitrarily distant Level I universe if
you were patient and the cosmic expansion decelerates.7
7 Astronomical evidence suggests that the cosmic expansion is
currently accelerating. If this acceleration continues, then even
the level I parallel universes will remain forever separate, with the
8A. Evidence for Level II parallel universes
Inflation is an extension of the big bang theory and
ties up many of its loose ends, such as why the uni-
verse is so big, so uniform and so flat. An almost expo-
nentially rapid stretching of space long ago can explain
all these and other attributes in one fell swoop (see re-
views [15, 16]. Such stretching is predicted by a wide
class of theories of elementary particles, and all avail-
able evidence bears it out. Much of space is stretching
and will continue doing so forever, but some regions of
space stop inflating and form distinct bubbles, like gas
pockets in a loaf of rising bread. Infinitely many such
bubbles emerge (Figure 1, lower left, with time increas-
ing upwards). Each is an embryonic Level I multiverse:
infinite in size8 and filled with matter deposited by the
energy field that drove inflation. Recent cosmological
measurements have confirmed two key predictions of in-
flation: that space has negligible curvature and that the
clumpiness in the cosmic matter distribution used to be
approximately scale invariant.
The prevailing view is that the physics we observe to-
day is merely a low-energy limit of a more general the-
ory that manifests itself at extremely high temperatures.
For example, this underlying fundamental theory may be
10-dimensional, supersymmetric and involving a grand
unification of the four fundamental forces of nature. A
common feature in such theories is that the potential en-
ergy of the field(s) relevant to inflation has many different
minima (sometimes called “metastable vacuum states”),
and ending up in different minima corresponds to dif-
ferent effective laws of physics for our low-energy world.
For instance, all but three spatial dimensions could be
curled up (“compactified”) on a tiny scale, resulting in
an effectively three-dimensional space like ours, or fewer
could curl up leaving a 5-dimensional space. Quantum
fluctuations during inflation can therefore cause differ-
ent post-inflation bubbles in the Level II multiverse to
end up with different effective laws of physics in differ-
ent bubbles — say different dimensionality or different
types of elementary particles, like two rather than three
generations of quarks.
In addition to such discrete properties as dimensional-
ity and particle content, our universe is characterized by
a set of dimensionless numbers known as physical con-
stants. Examples include the electron/proton mass ra-
tio mp/me ≈ 1836 and the cosmological constant, which
appears to be about 10−123 in so-called Planck units.
intervening space stretching faster than light can travel through
it. The jury is still out, however, with popular models predicting
that the universe will eventually stop accelerating and perhaps
even recollapse.
8 Surprisingly, it has been shown that inflation can produce an in-
finite Level I multiverse even in a bubble of finite spatial volume,
thanks to an effect whereby the spatial directions of spacetime
curve towards the (infinite) time direction [17].
There are models where also such non-integer parame-
ters can vary from one post-inflationary bubble to an-
other.9 In summary, the Level II multiverse is likely to
be more diverse than the Level I multiverse, containing
domains where not only the initial conditions differ, but
perhaps the dimensionality, the elementary particles and
the physical constants differ as well.
This is currently a very active research area. The pos-
sibility of a string theory “landscape” [18, 19], where the
above-mentioned potential has perhaps 10500 different
minima, may offer a specific realization of the Level II
multiverse which would in turn have four sub-levels of
increasing diversity: IId: different ways in which space
can be compactified, which can allow both different effec-
tive dimensionality and different symmetries/elementary
articles (corresponding to different topology of the curled
up extra dimensions). IIc: different “fluxes” (generalized
magnetic fields) that stabilize the extra dimensions (this
sublevel is where the largest number of choices enter, per-
haps 10500). IIb: once these two choices have been made,
there may be a handful of different minima in the effec-
tive supergravity potential. IIa: the same minimum and
effective laws of physics can be realized in a many differ-
ent post-inflationary bubbles, each constituting a Level I
multiverse.
Before moving on, let us briefly comment on a few
closely related multiverse notions. First of all, if one
Level II multiverse can exist, eternally self-reproducing in
a fractal pattern, then there may well be infinitely many
other Level II multiverses that are completely discon-
nected. However, this variant appears to be untestable,
since it would neither add any qualitatively different
worlds nor alter the probability distribution for their
properties. All possible initial conditions and symmetry
breakings are already realized within each one.
An idea proposed by Tolman and Wheeler and recently
elaborated by Steinhardt & Turok [20] is that the (Level
I) multiverse is cyclic, going through an infinite series of
Big Bangs. If it exists, the ensemble of such incarnations
would also form a multiverse, arguably with a diversity
similar to that of Level II.
An idea proposed by Smolin [21] involves an ensem-
ble similar in diversity to that of Level II, but mutating
and sprouting new universes through black holes rather
than during inflation. This predicts a form of a natu-
9 Although the fundamental equations of physics are the same
throughout the Level II multiverse, the approximate effective
equations governing the low-energy world that we observe will
differ. For instance, moving from a three-dimensional to a four-
dimensional (non-compactified) space changes the observed grav-
itational force equation from an inverse square law to an inverse
cube law. Likewise, breaking the underlying symmetries of parti-
cle physics differently will change the lineup of elementary parti-
cles and the effective equations that describe them. However, we
will reserve the terms “different equations” and “different laws of
physics” for the Level IV multiverse, where it is the fundamental
rather than effective equations that change.
9ral selection favoring universes with maximal black hole
production.
In braneworld scenarios, another 3-dimensional world
could be quite literally parallel to ours, merely offset in a
higher dimension. However, it is unclear whether such a
world (“brane”) deserves be be called a parallel universe
separate from our own, since we may be able to interact
with it gravitationally much as we do with dark matter.
B. Fine-tuning and selection effects
Although we cannot interact with other Level II par-
allel universes, cosmologists can infer their presence in-
directly, because their existence can account for unex-
plained coincidences in our universe. To give an analogy,
suppose you check into a hotel, are assigned room 1967
and note that this is the year you were born. What a
coincidence, you say. After a moment of reflection, how-
ever, you conclude that this is not so surprising after all.
The hotel has hundreds of rooms, and you would not have
been having these thoughts in the first place if you had
been assigned one with a number that meant nothing to
you. The lesson is that even if you knew nothing about
hotels, you could infer the existence of other hotel rooms
to explain the coincidence.
As a more pertinent example, consider the mass of the
sun. The mass of a star determines its luminosity, and us-
ing basic physics, one can compute that life as we know
it on Earth is possible only if the sun’s mass falls into
the narrow range between 1.6× 1030kg and 2.4× 1030kg.
Otherwise Earth’s climate would be colder than that
of present-day Mars or hotter than that of present-day
Venus. The measured solar mass is M ∼ 2.0 × 1030kg.
At first glance, this apparent coincidence of the habitable
and observed mass values appears to be a wild stroke of
luck. Stellar masses run from 1029 to 1032kg, so if the sun
acquired its mass at random, it had only a small chance
of falling into the habitable range. But just as in the ho-
tel example, one can explain this apparent coincidence by
postulating an ensemble (in this case, a number of plan-
etary systems) and a selection effect (the fact that we
must find ourselves living on a habitable planet). Such
observer-related selection effects are referred to as “an-
thropic” [22], and although the “A-word” is notorious
for triggering controversy, physicists broadly agree that
these selection effects cannot be neglected when testing
fundamental theories. In this weak sense, the anthropic
principle is not optional.
What applies to hotel rooms and planetary systems
applies to parallel universes. Most, if not all, of the
attributes set by symmetry breaking appear to be fine-
tuned. Changing their values by modest amounts would
have resulted in a qualitatively different universe–one in
which we probably would not exist. If protons were
0.2% heavier, they could decay into neutrons, destabiliz-
ing atoms. If the electromagnetic force were 4% weaker,
there would be no hydrogen and no normal stars. If the
FIG. 3: Difference between Level I and Level III. Whereas
Level I parallel universes are far away in space, those of Level
III are even right here, with quantum events causing classical
reality to split and diverge into parallel storylines. Yet Level
III adds no new storylines beyond levels 1 or 2.
weak interaction were much weaker, hydrogen would not
exist; if it were much stronger, supernovae would fail to
seed interstellar space with heavy elements. If the cos-
mological constant were much larger, the universe would
have blown itself apart before galaxies could form. In-
deed, most if not all the parameters affecting low-energy
physics appear fine-tuned at some level, in the sense that
changing them by modest amounts results in a qualita-
tively different universe.
Although the degree of fine-tuning is still debated (see
[23–25, 40]) for more technical reviews), these examples
suggest the existence of parallel universes with other val-
ues of some physical constants. The existence of a Level
II multiverse implies that physicists will never be able to
determine the values of all physical constants from first
principles. Rather, they will merely compute probability
distributions for what they should expect to find, taking
selection effects into account. The result should be as
generic as is consistent with our existence.
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IV. LEVEL III: THE MANY WORLDS OF
QUANTUM PHYSICS
If Everett was correct and physics is unitary, then there
is a third type of parallel worlds that are not far away
but in a sense right here. The universe keeps branch-
ing into parallel universes as in the cartoon (Figure 3,
bottom): whenever a quantum event appears to have a
random outcome, all outcomes in fact occur, one in each
branch. This is the Level III multiverse. Although more
debated and controversial than Level I and Level II, we
will see that, surprisingly, this level adds no new types of
universes.
Since the volume to which this chapter belongs dis-
cusses the MWI in great detail, we will summarize the
key points only very briefly. Everett’s MWI is simply
standard quantum mechanics with the collapse postulate
removed, so that the Schro¨dinger equation holds without
exception (Section IA). From this, the following conclu-
sions can be derived:
1. Microsuperpositions (say of an atom going through
two slits at the same time) are inevitable (the
Heisenberg Uncertainty principle).
2. Macrosuperpositions (say of a cat being dead and
alive) are also perfectly legitimate quantum states.
3. Processes occur that amplify microsuperpositions
into macrosuperpositions (spontaneous symmetry
breaking, Schro¨dinger’s cat, and quantum measure-
ments being three examples).
4. The superposition of a single macroscopic object
tends to spread to all other interacting objects,
eventually engulfing our entire universe.
5. Decoherence makes most macrosuperpositions for
all practical purposes unobservable.
6. Decoherence calculations can determine which
quantities appear approximately classical.
There is consensus in the physics community that both
double-slit interference and the process of decoherence
have been experimentally observed, showing the pre-
dicted behavior. Conclusions 1, 2, 3 and 4 together im-
ply that astronomically large macrosuperpositions occur.
These are Everett’s parallel universes.10 Worry 10 in Ta-
ble 1 is addressed by 5, and worry 11 is addressed by 6
10 Note that to avoid creating macrosuperpositions, it is insuffi-
cient to abandon unitarity. Rather, it is symmetry that must be
abandoned. For example, any theory where the wavefunction of
a system evolves deterministically (even if according to another
rule than the Schro¨dinger equation) will evolve a perfectly sharp
needle balanced on its tip into a superposition of needles pointing
in macroscopically different directions unless the threory explic-
itly violates rotational symmetry. If the theory does violate this
symmetry and “collapses” the wavefunction, then there are two
as reviewed in [26–28]. It should be borne in mind that
these two worries remained serious open problems when
Everett first published his work, since decoherence was
only discovered in 1970 [29].
A. What are Level III parallel universes like?
Everett’s many-worlds interpretation has been bog-
gling minds inside and outside physics for more than
four decades. But the theory becomes easier to grasp
when one distinguishes between two ways of viewing a
physical theory: the outside view of a physicist study-
ing its mathematical equations, like a bird surveying a
landscape from high above it, and the inside view of an
observer living in the world described by the equations,
like a frog living in the landscape surveyed by the bird.
From the bird perspective, the Level III multiverse
is simple. There is only one wave function. It evolves
smoothly and deterministically over time without any
kind of splitting or parallelism. The abstract quantum
world described by this evolving wave function contains
within it a vast number of parallel classical story lines,
continuously splitting and merging, as well as a number
of quantum phenomena that lack a classical description.
From their frog perspective, observers perceive only a
tiny fraction of this full reality. They can view their own
Level I universe, but the process of decoherence [26, 29]
— which mimics wave function collapse while preserv-
ing unitarity–prevents them from seeing Level III parallel
copies of themselves.
Whenever observers are asked a question, make a snap
decision and give an answer, quantum effects in their
brains lead to a superposition of outcomes, such as “Con-
tinue reading the article” and “Put down the article”.
From the bird perspective, the act of making a decision
causes a person to split into multiple copies: one who
interesting possibilities: either the symmetry is broken early on
while the superposition is still microscopic and unobservable (in
which case the collapse process has nothing to do with measure-
ment), or the symmetry is broken later on when the superposi-
tion is macroscopic (in which case local energy conservation is
seriously violated by abruptly moving the center-of-mass by a
macroscopic amount — even if the mass transfer is not superlu-
minal, it would have to be fast enough to involve kinetic energy
greatly exceeding the natural energy scale of the problem). If this
experiment or Schro¨dinger’s cat experiment were performed in a
sealed free-falling box, the environment outside the box would
learn how the needle had fallen or whether the cat had died from
the altered gravitational field outside the box (and perhaps also
from recoil motion of the box), causing decoherence. However,
this complication can in principle be eliminated by keeping the
moving parts spherically symmetric at all times. For example,
if a metal sphere full of hydrogen contains a smaller sphere at
its center full of oxygen at the same pressure which is opened if
an atom decays (after which diffusion would mix the gases), the
resulting superposition of two macroscopically different density
distributions would leave all external fields unaffected.
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keeps on reading and one who doesn’t. From their frog
perspective, however, each of these alter egos is unaware
of the others and notices the branching merely as a slight
randomness: a certain probability of continuing to read
or not.
As strange as this may sound, the exact same situation
occurs even in the Level I multiverse. You have evidently
decided to keep on reading the article, but one of your
alter egos in a distant galaxy put down the magazine after
the first paragraph. The only difference between Level I
and Level III is where your doppelgaa¨ngers reside. In
Level I they live elsewhere in good old three-dimensional
space. In Level III they live on another quantum branch
in infinite-dimensional Hilbert space (Figure 3).
B. Level III parallel universes: evidence &
implications
The existence of Level III depends on one crucial as-
sumption: that the time evolution of the wave function
is unitary. So far experimenters have encountered no de-
partures from unitarity. In the past few decades they
have confirmed unitarity for ever larger systems, includ-
ing carbon 60 buckyball molecules and kilometer-long op-
tical fibers. On the theoretical side, the case for unitarity
has been bolstered by the discovery of decoherence (see
[27] for a popular review). Some theorists who work on
quantum gravity have questioned unitarity; one concern
is that evaporating black holes might destroy informa-
tion, which would be a nonunitary process. But a recent
breakthrough in string theory known as AdS/CFT corre-
spondence suggests that even quantum gravity is unitary.
If so, black holes do not destroy information but merely
transmit it elsewhere.
If physics is unitary, then the standard picture of how
quantum fluctuations operated early in the big bang must
change. These fluctuations did not generate initial con-
ditions at random. Rather they generated a quantum
superposition of all possible initial conditions, which co-
existed simultaneously. Decoherence then caused these
initial conditions to behave classically in separate quan-
tum branches. Here is the crucial point: the distribution
of outcomes on different quantum branches in a given
Hubble volume (Level III) is identical to the distribution
of outcomes in different Hubble volumes within a single
quantum branch (Level I). This property of the quantum
fluctuations is known in statistical mechanics as ergodic-
ity.
The same reasoning applies to Level II. The process
of symmetry breaking did not produce a unique outcome
but rather a superposition of all outcomes, which rapidly
went their separate ways. So if physical constants, space-
time dimensionality and so on can vary among parallel
quantum branches at Level III, then they will also vary
among parallel universes at Level II.
In other words, the Level III multiverse adds nothing
new beyond Level I and Level II, just more indistinguish-
able copies of the same universes–the same old story lines
playing out again and again in other quantum branches.
The passionate debate about Everett’s theory therefore
seems to be ending in a grand anticlimax, with the dis-
covery of less controversial multiverses (Levels I and II)
that are equally large.
C. The unequal probability worry
Let us now turn to worry 6 in Table 1: how to com-
pute the apparent probabilities from the wave function
amplitudes when they are not all equal and the wave-
function collapse postulate has been dropped from the
theory. Since a single approximately classical state often
evolves into a superposition of macroscopically different
states that rapidly decohere as discussed above, it is obvi-
ous that observers will experience apparent randomness
just as in our hospital examples from Section II C. How-
ever, why is it that these probabilities correspond to the
square modulus of the wave function amplitudes (the so-
called Born rule)? For example, in equation (2), why is
the apparent probability for a happy observer equal to
|α2| rather than some other real-valued function of α,
say |α|4?
There are a number of arguments that suggest that it
must be this way. For example, one could argue that
the sum of the probabilities should be conserved (so that
it can be normalized to 1 once and for all), and
∫
|φ|2
is the only functional of ψ that is conserved under ar-
bitrary unitary evolution, by the very definition of uni-
tarity. In other words, the business about the squaring
comes straight from the Hilbert-space structure of quan-
tum mechanics, whereby the inner product defines an L2
norm but no other norms.
Other arguments to this end have been proposed,
based on information theory [2], decision theory [30] and
other approaches [28, 31, 32]. But many authors have
expressed a deeper concern about whether probability in
the usual sense even makes sense in MWI (often focused
around some combination of worries 4 and 5). To this
end, arguments have been proposed based on Savage’s
approach: whatever intelligent observers actually believe,
they will behave as though ascribing subjective probabil-
ities to outcomes — probabilities which, as [30, 33, 34]
showed, match the Born rule. A rigorous mathematical
treatment of this is given by Wallace in Chapter of this
volume.
At the extensive debates about this issue at the “Ev-
erett @ 50” conference at the Perimiter Institute in 2007,
it was clear that these purported Born Rule derivations
were still controversial. Interestingly, the entire con-
troversy centered around the equal-probability case (say
α = β in equation (2)), i.e., getting probabilities in the
first place (worries 4 and 5 in Table 1). In contrast, the
notion that this can be generalized to arbitrary ampli-
tudes (worry 6 in Table 1) was fairly uncontroversial. In
summary, worry 6 is the first one in Table 1 which is
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truly specific to quantum mechanics, but addressing it if
worries 4 and 5 have been settled is arguably a solved
problem.
D. Does the state describe the world or my
knowledge of it?
A quantum state can be mathematically described by
a density matrix. But what does this density matrix
really describe? The state of the universe or your state
of knowledge about it? This issue, listed as worry 7 in
Table 1, is as old as quantum mechanics itself and still
divides the physics community.
The Everett postulate implies a clear answer to it:
both! On one hand, the entire universe has a quan-
tum state which corresponds to a wavefunction, or to
a density matrix if the state is mixed. Let us call this
the ontological quantum state. On the other hand, our
state of knowledge of the universe is described by a lower-
dimensional density matrix for those degrees of freedom
that we are interested in, both conditioned on what we
already know (limiting to those branches that we could
be on — what Everett termed the “relative state”) and
partial-traced over those degrees of freedom that we know
nothing about. I will refer to this as the epistemological
quantum state, bearing in mind that it differs from one
observer to the another — both from a colleague in this
branch of the wavefunction and from yourself in another
branch11. In other words, the epistemological quantum
state is derivable from the ontological quantum state and
your subjective observations. When quantum textbooks
refer to “the” state, they usually mean the the epistemo-
logical state of a system according to you, after you have
prepared it in a certain way. This is further elaborated
in [36].
The density-matrix aspect of this issue is clearly
quantum-specific. However, the dichotomy between ob-
jective and subjective descriptions appears in classical
statistical mechanics as well: an ensemble of classical
worlds can be completely described by a probability dis-
tribution in a high-dimensional phase space, whereas
the knowledge of the world by an individual observer
is described by a probability distribution in a lower-
dimensional phase space, again computable by condition-
ing (the classical equivalent of computing a relative state)
and marginalizing (the classical equivalent of partial trac-
ing).
11 Whereas the ontological state might be pure and hence describ-
ably by a wave function, the epistemological state is generically
mixed and cannot be described by a wavefunction, only by a
density matrix. This was pointed out already by Schro¨dinger
[35]
E. The weirdness worry
Despite all the elaborate technical and philosophical
worries about the MWI listed in Table 1, many physicists
probably find their strongest objection to the MWI not
in their brain but in their gut: it simply feels too weird,
crazy, counter-intuitive and disturbing.
The complaint about weirdness is aesthetic rather than
scientific, and it really makes sense only in the Aris-
totelian world view. Yet what did we expect? When we
ask a profound question about the nature of reality, do we
not expect an answer that sounds strange? I personally
dismiss this weirdness worry as a failure to appreciate
Darwinian evolution. Evolution endowed us with intu-
ition only for those aspects of physics that had survival
value for our distant ancestors, such as the parabolic tra-
jectories of flying rocks. Darwin’s theory thus makes the
testable prediction that whenever we look beyond the
human scale, our evolved intuition should break down.
We have repeatedly tested this prediction, and the re-
sults overwhelmingly support it: our intuition breaks
down at high speeds where time slows down, on small
scales where particles can be in two places at once, on
large scales where we encounter black holes, and at high
temperatures, where colliding particles change identity.
To me, an electron colliding with a positron and turning
into a Z-boson feels about as intuitive as two colliding
cars turning into a cruise ship. The point is that if we
dismiss seemingly weird theories out of hand, we risk dis-
missing the correct theory if we stumble across it.
F. Two world views
The seemingly endless debate over the interpretation
of quantum mechanics is in a sense the tip of an ice-
berg. In the Sci-Fi spoof “Hitchhiker’s Guide to the
Galaxy”, the answer is discovered to be “42”, and the
hard part is finding the real question. Questions about
parallel universes may seem to be just about as deep as
queries about reality can get. Yet there is a still deeper
underlying question: there are two tenable but diamet-
rically opposed paradigms regarding physical reality and
the status of mathematics, a dichotomy that arguably
goes as far back as Plato and Aristotle, and the question
is which one is correct.
• ARISTOTELIAN PARADIGM: The subjec-
tively perceived frog perspective is physically real,
and the bird perspective and all its mathematical
language is merely a useful approximation.
• PLATONIC PARADIGM: The bird perspec-
tive (the mathematical structure) is physically real,
and the frog perspective and all the human lan-
guage we use to describe it is merely a useful ap-
proximation for describing our subjective percep-
tions.
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What is more basic — the frog perspective or the bird
perspective? What is more basic — human language or
mathematical language? Your answer will determine how
you feel about parallel universes.
If you prefer the Aristotelian paradigm, you share
worry 3 in Table 1. If you prefer the Platonic paradigm,
you should find multiverses natural, since our feeling that
say the Level III multiverse is “weird” merely reflects
that the frog and bird perspectives are extremely differ-
ent. We break the symmetry by calling the latter weird
because we were all indoctrinated with the Aristotelian
paradigm as children, long before we even heard of math-
ematics - the Platonic view is an acquired taste!
In the second (Platonic) case, all of physics is ulti-
mately a mathematics problem, since an infinitely intel-
ligent mathematician given the fundamental equations of
the cosmos could in principle compute the frog perspec-
tive, i.e., compute what self-aware observers the universe
would contain, what they would perceive, and what lan-
guage they would invent to describe their perceptions
to one another. In other words, there is a “Theory of
Everything” (TOE) whose axioms are purely mathemat-
ical, since postulates in English regarding interpretation
would be derivable and thus redundant. In the Aris-
totelian paradigm, on the other hand, there can never
be a TOE, since one is ultimately just explaining certain
verbal statements by other verbal statements — this is
known as the infinite regress problem [37].
In [38, 39], I have argued that the Platonic paradigm
follows logically from the innocuous-sounding External
Reality Hypothesis (ERH) [38]: “there exists an external
physical reality completely independent of us humans”.
More specifically, [38] argues that the ERH implies the
Mathematical Universe Hypothesis” (MUH) that our ex-
ternal physical reality is a mathematical structure. The
detailed technical definition of a mathematical structure
is not important here; just think of it as a set of abstract
entities with relations between them — familiar exam-
ples of mathematical structures include the integers, a
Riemannian manifold, and a Hilbert space.
V. LEVEL IV: OTHER MATHEMATICAL
STRUCTURES
Suppose you buy the Mathematical Universe Hypothe-
sis and believe that we simply have not found the correct
equations yet, or more rigorously, the correct mathemat-
ical structure? Then an embarrassing question remains,
as emphasized by John Archibald Wheeler: Why these
particular equations, not others? [38] argues that, when
pushed to its extreme, the MUH implies that all mathe-
matical structures correspond to physical universes. To-
gether, these structures form the Level IV multiverse,
which includes all the other levels within it. If there is
a particular mathematical structure that is our universe,
and its properties correspond to our physical laws, then
each mathematical structure with different properties is
its own universe with different laws. The Level IV mul-
tiverse is compulsory, since mathematical structures are
not “created” and don’t exist “somewhere” — they just
exist. Stephen Hawking once asked, “What is it that
breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for
them to describe?” In the case of the mathematical cos-
mos, there is no fire-breathing required, since the point is
not that a mathematical structure describes a universe,
but that it is a universe.
In a famous essay, Wigner [41] argued that “the enor-
mous usefulness of mathematics in the natural sciences is
something bordering on the mysterious”, and that “there
is no rational explanation for it”. This argument can be
taken as support for the MUH: here the utility of math-
ematics for describing the physical world is a natural
consequence of the fact that the latter is a mathemat-
ical structure, and we are simply uncovering this bit by
bit. The various approximations that constitute our cur-
rent physics theories are successful because simple math-
ematical structures can provide good approximations of
how an observer will perceive more complex mathemati-
cal structures. In other words, our successful theories are
not mathematics approximating physics, but mathemat-
ics approximating mathematics. Wigner’s observation is
unlikely to be based on fluke coincidences, since far more
mathematical regularity in nature has been discovered
in the decades since he made it, including the standard
model of particle physics. Detailed discussions of the
Level IV multiverse, what it means and what it predicts
are given in [38, 40].
VI. DISCUSSION
We have discussed Everett’s Many-Worlds Interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics in the context of other physics
disputes and the three other levels of parallel universes
that have been proposed in the literature. We found that
only a small fraction of the usual objections to Everett’s
theory (summarized in Table 1) are specific to quantum
mechanics, and that all of the most controversial issues
crop up also in settings that have nothing to do with
quantum mechanics.
A. The multiverse hierarchy
We have seen that scientific theories of parallel uni-
verses form a four-level hierarchy, in which universes be-
come progressively more different from ours. They might
have different initial conditions (Level I), different effec-
tive physical laws, constants and particles (Level II), or
different fundamental physical laws (Level IV). It is ironic
that Everett’s Level III is the one that has drawn the
most fire in the past decades, because it is the only one
that adds no qualitatively new types of universes.
Whereas the Level I universes join seemlessly, there are
clear demarcations between those within levels II and III
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caused by inflating space and decoherence, respectively.
The level IV universes are completely disconnected and
need to be considered together only for predicting your
future, since “you” may exist in more than one of them.
B. Are parallel universes wasteful?
A common argument about all forms of parallel uni-
verses, including Everett’s Level III ones, is that they
feel wasteful. Specifically, the wastefulness worry (#2 in
Table 1) is that multiverse theories are vulnerable to Oc-
cam’s razor because they postulate the existence of other
worlds that we can never observe. Why should nature be
so wasteful and indulge in such opulence as an infinity
of different worlds? Yet this argument can be turned
around to argue for a multiverse. What precisely would
nature be wasting? Certainly not space, mass or atoms
– the uncontroversial Level I multiverse already contains
an infinite amount of all three, so who cares if nature
wastes some more? The real issue here is the apparent
reduction in simplicity. A skeptic worries about all the
information necessary to specify all those unseen worlds.
But an entire ensemble is often much simpler than one
of its members. This principle can be stated more for-
mally using the notion of algorithmic information con-
tent. The algorithmic information content in a number
is, roughly speaking, the length of the shortest computer
program that will produce that number as output. For
example, consider the set of all integers. Which is sim-
pler, the whole set or just one number? Naively, you
might think that a single number is simpler, but the
entire set can be generated by quite a trivial computer
program, whereas a single number can be hugely long.
Therefore, the whole set is actually simpler.
Similarly, the set of all solutions to Einstein’s field
equations is simpler than a specific solution. The for-
mer is described by a few equations, whereas the latter
requires the specification of vast amounts of initial data
on some hypersurface. The lesson is that complexity in-
creases when we restrict our attention to one particular
element in an ensemble, thereby losing the symmetry and
simplicity that were inherent in the totality of all the el-
ements taken together.
In this sense, the higher-level multiverses are simpler.
Going from our universe to the Level I multiverse elimi-
nates the need to specify initial conditions, upgrading to
Level II eliminates the need to specify physical constants,
and the Level IV multiverse eliminates the need to spec-
ify anything at all. The opulence of complexity is all in
the subjective perceptions of observers [42] — the frog
perspective. From the bird perspective, the multiverse
could hardly be any simpler.
A common feature of all four multiverse levels is that
the simplest and arguably most elegant theory involves
parallel universes by default. To deny the existence of
those universes, one needs to complicate the theory by
adding experimentally unsupported processes and ad hoc
postulates: finite space, wave function collapse, ontologi-
cal asymmetry, etc. Our judgment therefore comes down
to which we find more wasteful and inelegant: many
worlds or many words.
C. Are parallel universes testable
We have discussed how multiverses are not a theories
but predictions of certain theories, and how such the-
ories are falsifiable as long as they also predict some-
thing that we can test here in our own universe. There
are ample future prospects for testing and perhaps rul-
ing out these multiverse theories. In the coming decade,
dramatically improved cosmological measurements of the
microwave background radiation, the large-scale matter
distribution, etc., will test Level I by further constraining
the curvature and topology of space and will test level II
by providing stringent tests of inflation. Progress in both
astrophysics and high-energy physics should also clarify
the extent to which various physical constants are fine-
tuned, thereby weakening or strengthening the case for
Level II. If the current world-wide effort to build quantum
computers succeeds, it will provide further evidence for
Level III, since such computers are most easily explained
as, in essence, exploiting the parallelism of the Level III
multiverse for parallel computation [43]. Conversely, ex-
perimental evidence of unitarity violation would rule out
Level III. unifying general relativity and quantum field
theory, will shed more light on Level IV. Either we will
eventually find a mathematical structure matching our
universe, or we will and have to abandon Level IV.
D. So was Everett right?
Our conclusions regarding Table 1 do not per se argue
either for or against the MWI, merely clarify what as-
sumptions about physics lead to what conclusions. How-
ever, all the controversial issues arguably melt away if
we accept the External Reality Hypothesis (ERH) [38]:
there exists an external physical reality completely in-
dependent of us humans. Suppose that this hypothesis
is correct. Then the core MWI critique rests on some
combination of the following three dubious assumptions.
1. Omnivision assumption: physical reality must
be such that at least one observer can in principle
observe all of it.
2. Pedagogical reality assumption: physical real-
ity must be such that all reasonably informed hu-
man observers feel they intuitively understand it.
3. No-copy assumption: no physical process can
copy observers or create subjectively indistinguish-
able observers.
15
1 and 2 appear to be motivated by little more than hu-
man hu¨bris. The omnivision assumption effectively re-
defines the word “exists” to be synonymous with what is
observable to us humans. Of course those who insist on
the pedagogical reality assumption will typically have re-
jected comfortingly familiar childhood notions like Santa
Claus, local realism, the Tooth Fairy, and creationism —
but have they really worked hard enough to free them-
selves from comfortingly familiar notions that are more
deeply rooted? In my personal opinion, our job as sci-
entists is to try to figure out how the world works, not
to tell it how to work based on our philosophical precon-
ceptions.
If the omnivision assumption is false, then there are
unobservable things that exist and we live in a multi-
verse. If the pedagogical reality assumption is false, then
the weirdness worry (#12 in Table 1) makes no sense.
If the no-copy assumption is false, then worries 4 and 5
from Table 1 are misguided: observers can perceive ap-
parent randomness even if physical reality is completely
deterministic and known. In this case, these fundamen-
tal conceptual questions raised by the MWI will arise in
physics anyway, independent of quantum mechanics, and
will need to be solved — indeed, Everett, in providing
a coherent and intelligible account of probability even in
the face of massive copying, has blazed a trail in showing
us how to solve them.
The ERH alone settles worry 9 in Table 1, since what
is in the external reality defines what exists. In summary,
if the ERH is correct, then the only outstanding question
about the MWI is whether physics is unitary or not. So
far, experiments have revealed no evidence of unitarity
violation, and ongoing and upcoming experiments will
test unitarity for dramatically larger systems.
My guess is that the only issues that worried Hugh Ev-
erett were 10 and 11 from Table 1, which are precisely
those which were laid to rest by the subsequent discov-
ery of decoherence. Perhaps we will gradually get more
used to the weird ways of our cosmos, and even find its
strangeness to be part of its charm. In fact, I met Hugh
Everett the other day and he told me that he agrees —
but alas not in this particular universe.
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